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S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
I. Identification of Parties, An understanding of the 
facts of this case requires an identification of the parties from 
two separate families• The families have become intertwined 
because divorce and remarriage in each resulted in an unplanned 
exchange of marital partners. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Bobbie C. Dickinson (hereafter 
Bobbie) was married to Defendant-Respondent, Sherril Cottrell 
Dickinson (hereafter Sherril). During the course of the marriage 
Bobbie developed a romantic relationship with Gloria Henrie 
(hereafter Gloria), then the wife of Wally Henrie (hereafter 
Wally). [TR23, 62-65, 97-99] 
The Henrie marriage ended in divorce (Henrie divorce) 
as did the Dickinson marriage, the decree in the latter having 
been entered on or about November 25, 1985 (Dickinson divorce). 
We are herein concerned with the Dickinson divorce. The 
Dickinson decree was made final upon entry and some six weeks 
later, on January 11, 1986, Bobbie married Gloria Henrie. 
[T13,10SEPT.86] Three months after that, on April 11, 1986, 
Wally Henrie married Sherril, thereby completing the unplanned 
exchange. [T38,10SEPT.86] There are three Dickinson children, 
two of whom reside with their mother, Sherril, and one with his 
father, Bobbie. Bobbie was ordered to pay $150 per child for the 
two children residing with their mother in the Henrie household. 
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i. i.-: : one who resides w^th h ^  i-:i^-ir 
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11 • The Trial and Original Decree , Bothi o f -: i .-d +"o -
division ol piopeity as well is debt assumption. Sherril 
questioned some personal property items 1 ut ill were iwarded 
j rocisel i lolil in 11 ill ii |HK ed, [lkl}b] t< anther, tin dobt 
assumption adopted by tho court was in conformity with Robbie's 
proposal I ith respect 1o tho c;orond mortgage on t ho f iin i I I J 
1I in uhi I J « * < i \ lojjot, Bobbie ie^ titled: 
Q. N vt one other item, m w under a listing 
of your expenses on item four I believe in 
accordance with an agreement that you and 
your wife had you had agreed to accept the 
second mortgage? is that right? 
A. I u ii 1) assume it. 
(). Ajid that is lour hundi c d I II n n nil , 
isn't M is that correct? 
I I h it i ; oorrrot , | TF41 ] 
* I MM I *jgi nil niq oi tho trial, Bobbie's counsel 
announced tho rosult which Bobbie dosiied and which, with only 
one exception was follow* 1 ilibi ' < nun rL s1 tlod, 
The division that ho has recommended is to 
give the Defendant the benefit of about two 
to one. He has also ro< oramended that the 
ownership of the home stay in both of th^ ra 
and if the home is ever abandoned by the 
Defendant, either by reason of marriage or by 
reason ol a permanent move or just that she 
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elects to sell that then the equity in the 
home which remains be divided equally. [TR6] 
The court declined to accept Bobbie's recommendation 
regarding the equity in the home and awarded the same to Sherril. 
The evidence revealed that the second mortgage on the 
family home had resulted from a consolidation of miscellaneous 
debts. [TR31;T36,10SEPT.86] Consistent with the agreement of 
the parties, Bobbie was ordered to pay this debt and Sherril was 
ordered to pay the first mortgage on the family home. [TR124] 
The division proposed by Bobbie did not cover a supply 
of fire wood which Bobbie had taken to Gloria Henrie's home and 
his mothers home. [TR104-105] The court ordered Bobbie to 
deliver one-half of this wood to Sherril. [TR126]. 
Sherril did not want the divorce and encouraged a 
reconciliation after Bobbie's initial interest in Gloria. [TR97-
98] The parties received counseling and sought to reconcile. 
[Id.] While Sherril was in the hospital and recuperating from 
surgery at her parent's home, Bobbie's interest in Gloria was 
rekindled and when Sherril returned home Bobbie advised that he 
was moving out. [Id.] 
Sherril was not well equipped to meet the financial 
demands of life alone. Her earning power was $2,100 a year, 
whereas Bobbie had an annual earning power of $25,000. [TR124] 
Sherril had worked and taken care of the home while Bobbie had 
obtained a college degree at Utah State University. [TR65-
67,103-104] 
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At the time of trial Sherril had no source of income 
other than a part-time job which produced $17 5 per month. 
[TR102] After Bobbie left, she enrolled at the Sevier Valley 
Tech with plans to continue her eduction to become a teacher. 
[Id.] She testified she could not do this without Bobbie's 
assistance. [TR103] Bobbie was unwilling and felt he owed her 
no duty of assistance. He testified: 
Q. Do you know that she is going to school 
right now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think that she is entitled to some 
assistance in getting her degree? 
A. If she had contributed to books, school, 
and tuition, and those I would say yes, but 
she did not contribute to my books, school-
ing, and eduction. 
Q. So your theory is that because she paid 
rent and groceries that it doesn't count? 
A. It does count but I paid rent and 
groceries too plus everything else and so far 
as her obtaining her teacher's certificate 
there are many financial aids that does not 
have to be a pay-back until she obtains that 
certificate through the universities. There 
are government grants, loans and through my 
loan if I had obtained a teacher's certifi-
cate instead of a degree in forest management 
I would have had to pay it back. I could 
have borrowed any amount I wanted for 
tuition, rent, room and board and she can do 
exactly the same thing now. 
Q. The bottom line is you <3on't think you 
should help her at all. 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Do you figure you should give her any 
alimony? 
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A. Nof I don't. 
Q. It would be your position that you should 
just cut her free and do whatever? 
A. That is not my position. I will take 
care of my children but if she wants to make 
a living she thinks she needs she can get out 
and work because I don't owe her anything. 
Q. You propose to give her a hundred and 
twenty-five dollars a month per child which 
would be . . . two hundred and fifty [for two 
children] . . . 
A. With the insurance premiums included in 
that. That would put it up to a hundred and 
sixty. [TR67-68] 
The court disagreed and awarded Sherril $3 00 per month 
alimony for a period of twenty-four (24) months [TR125] and $150 
per month for each of the children together with insurance. 
[TR123-124] Sherril's counsel pressed for additional help for 
tuition and school expenses, but the court indicated that all of 
this had been taken into consideration in arriving at the overall 
award. [TR127-128] The award of the home equity was part of 
that award. 
The Appellant's brief creates serious misimpressions as 
to the nature of the court's approach to the property division. 
There were no findings regarding values as implied on page four 
and five of Appellant's brief. Such values were simply not at 
issue. Bobbie had introduced exhibits containing his opinion as 
to value, but since he also proposed a division fully embraced by 
the court and resisted only as to a couple of minor items by 
Sherril, the matter of values was not dealt with. Bobbie 
prevailed on the contested items. [TR125] 
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In addition to the serious disparity in earning power 
the evidence also revealed that Bobbie had a reasonable expecta-
tion of an enhanced business opportunity• His employer, Craig 
Anderson of Anderson Floral, testified as follows: 
Q. Mr. Dickinson has been with you twenty 
years or so? 
A. Approximately. 
Q. He is a good employee? 
A. Yes. We have a good relationship both 
ways. 
Q. And there has been actually some discus-
sion about him working into th« ownership of 
the business? 
A. I would hope that within the next three 
years we could work something out, yes. 
Q. And he would enjoy & preferential 
position over most anyone else you can think 
of? 
A. Yes, definitely. [TR88] 
Further, Bobbie had certain bonus money in hand at the 
time of the trial and had an expectation of more when a job then 
in process was completed. Specifically, the parties had tenta-
tively agreed that Sherril would receive an additional $1,400, 
which Bobbie declined to give her opting to wait and see if the 
court required the same. [TR108] The job then in process was at 
the Red Hills Middle School in Richfield on which he was to 
receive 3 0 percent of the profit. [TR58] No fixed dollar amount 
was determined, but Bobbie was awarded the same along with the 
bonus money then in his possession, notwithstanding the protesta-
tions of Sherrilfs counsel. [TR127-128] 
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Both parties were sufficiently satisfied with the 
Divorce Decree that neither took an appeal, 
III. The First Modification Hearing. The parties were 
back before the court on Bobbie's Petition for Modification, less 
than one year later, on September 10, 1986. By this time both 
had remarried and Bobbie sought to be freed from satisfaction of 
the second mortgage which he had previously agreed to assume. 
Bobbie's claim at this hearing was little different than the 
claim which he pressed the following May. Bobbie relied on the 
fact that Sherril had moved from the family home and had leased 
the same for a rental income of $260 per month. [T21,43,10SEPT.86] 
The evidence showed that after Sherril paid the first mortgage 
payment to the Farm Home Administration, the taxes, insurance and 
upkeep, her cash flow on the home was $10. [T43,10SEPT.86]1 
Bobbie further claimed a significant reduction in his 
income. His exhibit one [admitted at T2 0,10SEPT.87] reflected a 
gross income for the first seven and one-half months of 
$12,577.39. While the record does not reflect arithmetic 
computations, this would equate to an annual income of 
$20,123.82. Bobbie further claimed an increase in Sherril's 
income, which for the first seven and one-half months had been 
$1,388, [T40,10SEPT.86] exclusive of $15 per month from teaching 
piano lessons. [T41,10SEPT.86] Simple arithmetic places 
1
 While it did not surface at this hearing, the evidence 
before the Court on May 27, 1987, revealed that when Sherril 
moved out of the family home she became ineligible for continued 
financing through the Farm Home Administration and will be 
obliged to pay off the first mortgage within two years. [T34,27MAY87] 
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Sherrilfs annual income at the time of this hearing at $2,400.80• 
These income figures were contrasted to the divorce decree 
figures of $25,000 and $2,100 for Bobbie and Sherril 
respectively. 
Since Sherril had remarried the preceding April, 
Bobbie, on the advise of counsel, had discontinued the $3 00 per 
month alimony payment. [T25,10SEPT.86] Further, as a result of 
his remarriage, there was now an exchange of child support 
payments between the Dickinson and Henrie households. Bobbie 
acknowledged that he paid $3 00 per month to the Henrie household 
for his two minor children, but received $500 [$495] from the 
Henrie household for the three minor children of his current 
wife, Gloria. [T30;T47,10SEPT.86] 
At the conclusion of the evidence at the September 10, 
hearing, the court ruled that there had not been a material 
change of circumstances and ordered Bobbie to continue to make 
the mortgage payments as per the terms of the original decree. 
[T51-52,10SEPT.86] 
No appeal was taken from this decision. 
IV. The Contempt Proceedings. Bobbie discontinued 
making the second mortgage payments at or about the time of the 
modification hearing in September of 1986. He had made no 
further payments when the parties were before the court for 
contempt proceedings on the 13th day of May, 1987. [T6,13MAY87] 
Between the hearing of September 10, 1986, and the contempt 
hearing of May 13, 1987, the second mortgage was renegotiated 
resulting in a reduction of the monthly payment from $400 to 
$218. [T26,27MAY87] These negotiations had begun between Bobbie 
and his counsel and the bank, but when they failed Sherril and 
her current husband, Wally, agreed to the refinancing rather than 
to lose the home. [T17-25,13MAY87] The bank official, Brad W. 
Thompson, testified that the bank had been willing to agree to 
almost every concession requested by Bobbie and his counsel. 
[T19-21, 25-26,13MAY87] There was some dispute as to what offer 
the bank had extended to Bobbie, but the latter testified that he 
had been willing to pay $240 per month. [T60,13MAY87] Upon 
hearing this, the court sought to short-circuit the dispute and 
resolve the matter. 
THE COURT: Mr. Taylor, it seems to me that 
they've now done it, haven't they? [the 
monthly payment was now $218] 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. But we're looking at the 
contempt, Your Honor . . . 
THE COURT: It seems to me like we're 
spending a lot of time getting nowhere. 
That's the way it appears to me. They say 
they want you to assume it and you say that's 
what they want, and you say, "Well that's 
what we tried to get." To me, I just don't 
understand why we're spending time arguing 
about something that you claimed that's what 
you were trying to do. 
MR. TAYLOR: We want to show that we made a 
good faith effort to work out a deal with the 
bank. [T61,13MAY87] 
Bobbie was now unwilling to accept more preferential 
terms than he had previously sought, and insisted on proceeding 
with another Petition for Modification seeking to be fully 
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relieved from payment of the second mortgage.2 
In addition to his failure to make the mortgage 
payments, Bobbie failed or refused to sign a Quit Claim Deed on 
the family home which had been required by the bank and Sherril 
had incurred legal costs in obtaining an amendment to the decree 
in lieu of the requested deed. [T30-31,13MAY87] At the contempt 
hearing Bobbie finally agreed to sign the Quit Claim Deed. 
[T62,13MAY87] Further, Bobbie had undertaken to buy some things 
for the minor children and deducted the costs thereof from 
support payments due Sherril. This was remedied shortly before 
the contempt hearing, but not until after Sherril had expended 
considerable costs. [T28-29,13MAY87] 
At the conclusion of the contempt hearing the court 
ordered Bobbie to assume and pay the renegotiated debt at the 
bank and further awarded Sherril judgment for the interim 
payments she had been obliged to pay the bank along with $500 
attorney's fees. [T83,13MAY87] The court held Bobbie in 
contempt, sentenced him to 15 days in jail, but stayed execution 
so long as he was current in his payments at the bank for the 
succeeding year. [T83,13MAY87] 
V. The Second Petition for Modification. The second 
Petition for Modification came before the court on May 27, 1987. 
2
 The second petition for modification had been filed the 
morning of the contempt hearing (May 13, 1987). [T14,13MAY87] 
Sherril's counsel offered to respond to the petition in the same 
hearing without additional delay. [Id.] Bobbie's counsel 
declined [Id.] and at the conclusion of the proceedings it was 
stipulated that the matter would go forward two weeks later on 
May 27, 1987. [T84,13MAY87] 
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Counsel stipulated that the court could consider all of the 
evidence which had been introduced at the contempt hearing two 
weeks earlier. [T4,27MAY87] Bobbie's justification at the 
second modification hearing was essentially the same as had been 
presented at the hearing on the first petition. The only 
additional factor not present and argued to the court the 
preceding September was the majority of the oldest Henrie child, 
Michael. At the time of the May 27, hearing Michael had 
graduated from High School and was planning to attend college in 
the fall. While his father, Wally, had made the final support 
payment for Michael the month before, he testified that he was 
prepared to support him in college that fall and later on a 
mission. [T14,27MAY87] The boy's mother, Gloria, now Bobbie's 
wife, also testified that she and the boy's father, Wally, could 
provide the necessary help for the boy in college and in the 
mission field. [T41,27MAY87] The boy's father gave a revealing 
response: 
Q. What's the biggest obstacle in your 
having the means to help him on his mission? 
A. Well, having to assume Mr. Dickinson's 
debt. [T71,13MAY87] 
Sherril likewise agreed that her husband, Wally, should support 
his own son in the mission field. [T37,13MAY87] 
At the time the divorce was granted Bobbie was obli-
gated to pay $1,000 per month consisting of $300 child support, 
$300 alimony, and $4 00 on the second mortgage. At the time of 
the second modification hearing on May 27, 1987, this had been 
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cut almost in half. Bobbie acknowledged that he no longer paid 
alimony, that the second mortgage payment was only $218, and that 
he was paying $482 less at that time than at the time the decree 
was originally entered- [T25-26, 27MAY87] Of the $518 for which 
Bobbie remained obligated, $300 was child support paid to the 
Henrie household. Bobbie's household received $330 in return 
even after the majority of the child Michael. Bobbie's net 
monthly outflow was thereby reduced to $188. 
Because the May 13, hearing related to contempt, the 
court received broad income evidence on both of the Henries and 
both of the Dickinsons. The Henries had a combined 1986 gross 
income of $31,166.29 consisting of Wally's income of $28,438.29 
and Sherril's income of $2,728. [T13,27MAY87] Henrie's combined 
adjusted gross income was $28,848. [1T33,13MAY87] The court 
indicated this was the more fair figure. [T42,13MAY87] The 
combined Dickinson income, using Bobbie's figures, and assuming 
no unreported cash payments, was $29,333.92, $12,000 produced by 
Gloria [T53,27MAY87] and $17,333.92 produced by Bobbie. 
[T56,27MAY87] The legitimacy of Bobbie's figures were com-
promised by Bobbie's own testimony, that he and his wife had a 
net disposable income in 1986 of $34,539. [T49,13MAY87] 
Bobbie claimed that he and Gloria actually spent 
$37,440 during 1986 [T50,27MAY87] and this was so even though 
both their motor vehicles were paid for and they paid no mortgage 
debt except for the portion of the year they paid on the second 
mortgage in question. [T49-51,13MAY87] In contrast, during 1986 
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the Henries lived on a net income from Wally of $795 every two 
weeks, [T46,13MAY87] and a net income from Sherril of $175 per 
month [T33,27MAY86;T45,10SEPT.86] for an annual amount of 
$22,770, plus the $3,600 child support received from Bobbie 
making a grand total of $26,370. Testimony indicated a more 
frugal life style in the Henrie household. [T37-39,13MAY87] The 
difference between the Dickinson's net disposable income of 
$34,539 and their actual expenditures of $37,440 was funded with 
a credit card. [T54-55,13MAY87] 
S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T 
This appeal is an impermissible collateral attack on a 
property settlement contained in a divorce decree from which no 
appeal was taken. Appellantfs attempt to challenge the equity of 
the original decree should not be tolerated. 
Appellant has twice presented essentially the same 
evidence in support of petitions for modification. In both 
instances the lower court has found an inadequate change of 
circumstances to warrant upsetting the property settlement. 
Appellant failed to appeal from the first denial and, accord-
ingly, the second petition may also be fairly termed a collateral 
attack. 
The findings of the lower court are not "clearly 
erroneous" and Appellant has failed in his burden of establishing 
substantial prejudicial error or serous inequity manifesting a 
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clear abuse of discretion. 
Appellant's contemptuous unwillingness to abide by the 
decree and orders of the lower court, and his effort to undermine 
the same by collateral attacks, rather than timely appeals, 
warrants an award of costs and attorney's fees to Respondent 
under Rule 33(a) of this court. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I; IT IS IMPROPER TO CHALLENGE THE EQUITY OF THE 
ORIGINAL DECREE THROUGH A SUBSEQUENT PETITION FOR MODIFICATION, 
Appellant's brief clearly reflects a dissatisfaction 
with the provisions of the original divorce decree. Appellant 
goes behind the decree in an examination of values never really 
considered by the district court. The examination is a blatant 
effort to demonstrate that the decree was unfair. The law is 
clear that a divorce decree is res judicata as to circumstances 
existing at the time of the decree. [McLane vs. McLanef 750 P.2d 
692, (Utah 1977).] It is impermissible to collaterally attack a 
decree through a subsequent modification proceeding. rKessimakis 
vs. Kessimakis, 580 P. 2d 1090 (Utah 1978).] In Kessimakis the 
court stated • . . 
[Appellant's] attempt to challenge the equity 
of the original decree cannot be tolerated. 
[1091]. 
In a concurring opinion in the recent case of Kinsman vs. 
Kinsmanf 748 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988), Justice Jackson discusses 
the concept of res judicata as it relates to divorce decrees. 
16 
The doctrine cannot be given the carte blanche effect it is given 
in most civil litigation because of the continuing jurisdiction 
in divorce actions provided by statue (UCA 30-3-5). Nonetheless, 
as Judge Jackson notes, " 
The decree is res judicata as to circum-
stances existing at the time of the decree, 
[Kinsman, at 215, quoting from McLane vs. 
McLane, supra.] 
POINT II; AN ORDER ON A MODIFICATION PETITION SHOULD 
LIKEWISE BE RES JUDICATA AS TO CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTING AT THE TIME 
OF ITS ENTRY, 
In the interest of encouraging finality and avoidance 
of endless legal proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata 
discussed in the preceding point should be applicable as to 
circumstances existing at the time the court rules on a petition 
for modification. 
This would not preclude a party from showing at a 
subsequent hearing that there have been a sufficient number of 
additional changes to tip the scales of equity, but when the 
circumstances or factors relied upon are essentially the same, a 
party should not be able to collaterally attack a prior ruling 
from which no appeal was taken. 
When these parties were before the court on September 
10, 1986, the Appellant relied on precisely the same evidence, 
with one exception, that he relied upon at the hearing on the 
second petition for modification. The items are listed at page 
seven of Appellant's brief. They are, in abbreviated form, (a) 
Sherril's remarriage; (b) Sherril's increase in income; (c) 
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Sherril's lease of the Glenwood home; (d) Bobbie's decrease in 
income; (e) Majority of the oldest Henrie boy, Michael. 
Giving Appellant the best of the disputed evidence3, a 
comparison of the circumstances presented at the time of the 
first and second modification hearings are as follows: 
Factor Sept. 10, 1986 May 27, 1987 
(a) Sherril's Marital statues. remarried remarried 
(b) Sherril's personal income. $2,400 $2,728 
(c) Sherrils lease of Glenwood home, leased leased 
(d) Bobbie's income. $18,3004 $17,333 
(e) Majority of oldest Henrie child, minor 18 in Apr. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
Appellant indicates no appreciable change in the respective 
income of the parties. The only new factor was the majority of 
the oldest Henrie child who resides in the Dickinson home. Not 
only was his support a very temporary non-legal arrangement as 
discussed, supra page 12, but reliance thereon indirectly 
violates the maximum that a change of circumstances cannot be 
premised on a fact that was contemplated within the original 
decree. fWoodward vs. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985).] [Lea 
3
 It is the Respondent, of course, who is entitled to this 
treatment where it supports the decision of the lower court. 
4
 This is the figure given the court at the second 
modification hearing. In a dialogue with the Court during his 
opening statement Bobbie's counsel stated that Bobbie's decrease 
in income was from 18.3 thousand at the first modification 
hearing the preceding fall to 17.3 thousand at the time of the 
second hearing. [T6,27MAY87] The only evidence of Bobbie's 
income in September of 1986 was an exhibit reflecting his W-2 
earnings from the first seven and one-half months of that year. 
The court was given no guidance beyond that, but assuming uniform 
income to the end of the year, Bobbie's income would have been 
$20,123 in 1986. (See page 8, supra.) 
V, Bowers, 658 P. 2d 1213 (Utah 1983) and Kessimakis vs. 
Kessimakis. supra.] While support for the oldest Henrie child 
was not governed by the Dickinson decree, the time table for his 
becoming an adult would have been know at all times. The 
district court properly responded to a request for a finding that 
the majority of the oldest Henrie child was an anticipated event. 
THE COURT: You see, to me that gets to the 
ridiculous point. You know when he is gonna 
be 18 it terminates. I don't think I have to 
find that. I don't think I have to find that 
is was anticipated at the time I made the 
decree. Of course it was anticipated . . . . 
[T50-51,27MAY87] 
The second modification petition stands naked in light 
of the court's decision denying relief on the first petition 
based on the same evidence. 
POINT III; THE COURT'S FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE 
INCOME OF THE PARTIES ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Appellant's counsel pressed the court to find that 
Bobbie's income had dropped from $25,000 down to $17,333. The 
court's response is as follows: 
THE COURT: I have not been convinced that 
his income has been substantially modified. 
And I say that because at the time of the 
original trial his earnings by the W-2 
Statement was approximately what it is now, 
maybe a little less, and the other earnings 
was cash payments from arrangements he had 
with his employer, and at that time I felt 
that those amounts that came out, came out 
somewhat reluctantly and so I refuse to make 
that finding. I just don't find there's been 
a material change of circumstances based on 
earning power. 
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Before Appellant can attack this it is his duty to 
"marshall all of the evidence" in support of the court's find-
ings. As the Supreme Court said in Ashton vs. Ashton, 73 3 P.2d 
147, 150 (Utah 1987): 
Only then can we consider whether [the] 
findings are "clearly erroneous". 
The court went on to say: 
Because defendant's have failed to make such 
a showing, the trial courts findings will not 
be disturbed" [Id.] 
Appellant's brief fails to advise the court that 
Bobbie's evidence at trial did not fully disclose his income. 
His exhibit one reflected a 1983 income of $19,322, a 1984 income 
of $21,184, and a 1985 income of $16,984. Of the 1984 income 
only $16,184 had been shown on his employer's records. He 
acknowledged that $5,000, paid in commissions, had not been shown 
on his tax return. [TR28] On cross examination Bobbie further 
acknowledged that he received $100 a week in cash which would not 
have been shown on his W-2 income tax form. [TR51] He further 
admitted that he had not correctly reported his 1983 income. 
[TR54,56] Further, he acknowledged that he had told his wife, 
Sherril, that their 1984 income was about $30,000. [TR54] He 
explained that this included about $5,000 worth of insurance 
premiums but otherwise did not explain the difference. [TR55-56] 
Similarly there were cash bonuses which he had received in 1985 
not shown on his exhibit one. [TR57] 
Sherril disputed Bobbie's assertion that the $30,000 
figure for 1984 included reference to insurance. [TR90] She 
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further testified that she had examined the parties bank accounts 
for the years '83, '84 and '85 and found that the d€>posits were 
greater than Bobbie's description of income. [Id.] For example, 
in 1983 when Bobbie showed $16,383 net income (available for 
deposit), there were bank deposits totaling $23,085. [Id.] Even 
this would not have fully identified the income since Bobbie had 
previously acknowledged that not all the bonuses were deposited 
in the bank. [TR57] 
Another factor in this inquiry is Bobbie's testimony 
that during the year 1986 he and his new wife, Gloria, had "net 
disposable income" available for personal spending of $34,539.29, 
[T49,13MAY87] even though their combined gross income for that 
year was only $29,333.92. [T53-56,27MAY87] The difference was 
not explained by their use of a credit card. That use, Bobbie 
testified, resulted in actual expenditures of $37,440.00. 
[T50,13MAY87] 
Given the normal downward variance between gross and 
net income, it is unlikely that the child support received by 
Dickinsons from Henries would have supplied the extra income 
required to reach the $34,539 figure. It is a full $8,000 more 
net disposable income (including child support received) than was 
available to the Henrie household even though their reported 
gross incomes were comparable. [see factual summary at page 13-
14 hereof.] 
Under such circumstances it was not clearly erroneous 
for the lower court to conclude that Bobbie had failed in his 
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burden of proving a substantial diminution of earning capacity. 
The increase in Sherril's income was unimpressive. The 
court found her income had increased from some $2,100 annually to 
$2,728. There was no evidence to the contrary. With respect to 
Sherril's lease of the Glenwood home for $260 per month, the 
court found it did not augment her cash flow. The outlay on the 
first mortgage, taxes, insurance, and upkeep consumed the rental 
payment. [T56,27MAY87] These facts are undisputed in the 
record. 
POINT IV: APPELLANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A SUFFICIENT 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO WARRANT DISRUPTION OF THE ORIGINAL 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT, 
A District Judge is entitled considerable discretion in 
adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties and 
his determinations are entitled to a presumption of validity. 
[Peterson vs. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987); Hansen vs. 
Hansen, 736 P. 2d 1055 (Utah App. 1987).]5 Similarly, consider-
able deference is due the judgment of the trial court in deter-
mining whether to modify a divorce decree and that judgment is 
not to be disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates to 
the contrary or unless the trial court has abused its discretion 
or misapplied legal principles. [Stettler vs. Stettler, 713 P. 2d 
699 (Utah 1985).] On appeal the burden is on the Appellant to 
prove not only that the stated standard has been violated but 
that it has resulted in substantial prejudicial error, or serious 
5
 As discussed, supra, the failure to appeal renders the 
decree in these proceedings invulnerable to collateral attack. 
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inequity manifesting a clear abuse of discretion. [Mitchell vs. 
Mitchell, 526 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974).] Further, on appeal the 
reviewing court must give due deference to the advantageous 
position of the trial judge, [Fletcher vs. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 
1218 (Utah 1980).] who, since the parties are usually before him, 
can make a sounder appraisal of the situation. [Sorensen vs. 
Sorensen, 438 P.2d 180 (Utah 1968).] Finally, even though errors 
may be made, unless those errors alter the outcome of the case, 
they are viewed as harmless. rciausen vs. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562 
(Utah 1983) . ] 
Appellant directs the court's attention to the case of 
Chandler vs. West, 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1980). The precedent from 
that case is sound and its application herein is not resisted. 
The case holds that property settlements are not sacrosanct and 
beyond the power of a court of equity to modify. This is so 
notwithstanding the rule of law that property settlements are 
entitled to a greater sanctity than alimony and support payments 
in modification proceedings. [See Land vs. Land, 605 P. 2d 1248 
(Utah 1980).] 
Ultimately, the reviewing court must determine whether 
the trial court has so violated principles of fairness and equity 
that its decision cannot be allowed to stand, even in the face of 
its presumed validity and the deference to which its author is 
entitled. If the conscience of the reviewing court is truly 
shocked by the lower court's refusal to modify a decree, then 
such ruling ought not be permitted to stand. 
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The Chandler decision does not contain the final 
chapter. The Supreme Court addressed only the legal principle 
and then remanded stating: 
[T]his court is not in as an advantageous 
position [as the lower court] to make a fair 
determination as to which side has the 
balance of the equities.11 [1301] 
The case is more a strike against judicial rigidity 
than it is a guide to what equity ultimately required. The case 
is distinguishable from the case at bar in that the Plaintiff in 
Chandler had sold her home for $60,000 and the ultimate equitable 
issue was whether a $13,000 mortgage should be paid from the sale 
proceeds or by the defendant who had been making monthly pay-
ments. No information is available as to what happened on 
remand. 
In the instant case the following factors seem rele-
vant: 
1. The lower court wasn't satisfied that there had 
been a substantial change in the earning power of the parties. 
It is not difficult to understand how the court reached that 
conclusion from the conflicting and less than candid evidence 
Bobbie had given. Even if there would have been a change of the 
magnitude alleged, the court should not upset the property 
settlement in light of the other factors present. 
2. Bobbie's obligations growing out of the marriage 
had been reduced from $1,000 at the time of the decree ($300 
alimony, $300 child support, $400 second mortgage payment) to 
$518 at the time of the hearing on the second petition for 
modification. 
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3. The $300 child support paid by Bobbie to the 
Henrie household was more than offset by the $3 3 0 received in 
return• Up until shortly before the second modification hearing 
the return support had been $495. When the child support is 
considered, Bobbie's net outflow at the time of the hearing on 
the second petition was limited to $188 and shortly before had 
only been $23. 
4. While secured by a pledge of the Glenwood home, 
the second mortgage arose from the consolidation of several 
family debts including a debt on Bobbie's truck that is now free 
and clear [T31;T36,10SEPT.86;T49,13MAY87]. 
5. Sherril's income continues to be very modest 
($2,728 annually). Whether Bobbie's income remains at $25,000 or 
has decreased to $17,333, as alleged, the disparity is still 
overwhelming. 
6. If the income of spouses are considered, then, at 
the least, the Dickinson household has an annual income compar-
able to the Henrie household, and given what Bobbie testified was 
the Dickinson's "net disposable income", the Dickinsons have 
substantially more money to actually spend. 
7. Finally, Respondent urges one other factor of 
considerable equitable importance. Parties to divorce litigation 
should be able to rely on the finality of property settlements 
unless the change of circumstances is truly substantial. 
Property settlements, which the court found this one clearly was, 
[T55,27MAY87] though not sacrosanct, ought not be subject to 
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disruption whenever one of the parties has a shift in their 
annual income• That is especially true where, as here, Bobbie's 
regular income has, even by his own testimony, remained uniform 
and where bonuses come from special jobs which cannot be pre-
dicted with reliability. If the court is obliged to react to 
what may well be temporary income shifts, the parties may "whip-
saw" each other every time the financial climate changes. If, 
for example, Bobbie were relieved of the obligation to make the 
$218 second mortgage payment, should he be hauled back into court 
on a petition to reinstate this obligation when he receives his 
commission on the Red Hills Middle School job which he indicated 
would be paid in the future? [TR58-59,27MAY87] What if he 
receives the ownership interest in the business which would now 
be imminent? [TR88; page 7 supra] If Sherril completes her 
schooling and obtains a teaching certificate, must she do so at 
the peril of being dragged back into court to relitigate the 
property division? 
The undersigned respectfully submits that there isn't 
anything in this case which has happened or which can now be 
reasonably contemplated which would warrant the court's revisit-
ing and upsetting the property settlement. 
POINT V. THIS A PROPER CASE FOR AWARDING RESPONDENT 
HER COSTS AND A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE. 
Rule 33(a) (Utah Ct. App.) authorizes an award of costs 
and attorney's fees to the prevailing party if the appeal is 
determined to be either frivolous or brought for delay. 
26 
This court recently had occasion to deal with this rule 
in the case of Eames vs. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987)• 
While Respondent does not impugn the good faith of 
Appellant's counsel, she respectfully, submits that the record 
establishes a contemptuous attitude on the part of the Appellant 
toward the orders of the lower court and a total lack of any 
sense of obligation to his wife of 14 years. His attitude toward 
the court is evidenced by the adjudication of contempt on May 13, 
1987. His attitude toward giving any assistance to the wife who 
helped him through college and cared for his home and family was 
amply reflected in the testimony cited on pages 5-6 of this 
brief. 
A similar attitude led this court in the Eames case to 
question the sincerity of the appeal and the position advanced by 
the Appellant. 
Surely a wife of 30 years deserves something 
more than being cast adrift in the sea of 
economic uncertainly without some long-term 
support from a husband with superior earning 
potential. [Id. at 398] 
It perhaps goes without saying that the extensive 
litigation herein, including particularly this appeal., has been 
extremely costly and disquieting to the Respondent. Surely the 
Appellant can see that this matter should have been put to rest 
before, and that there has not been a clear shifting of the 
equities such as to warrant the court unwinding the property 
settlement established in the original decree from which no 
appeal was taken. 
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Appellant's collateral attack on the original decree as 
well as his collateral attack on the denial from the first 
modification petition, raises a reasonable and almost inescapable 
inference of bad faith. [see Cady vs. Johnson, 671 P. 2d 149 
(Utah 1983)] 
S U M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U S I O N 
Appellant has failed to meet the burden of establishing 
a material change of circumstances warranting a modification of 
the property settlement contained in the divorce decree. The 
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Further, it seems appropriate for the court to evoke 
the power it has under Rule 33(a) and to award Respondent costs 
and attorney's fees and to remand the matter to the district 
court for a determination of those costs and attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this^JL^^ &&Y of June, A.D. 
1988. 
KAY L. ^ TCTFF, >OR 
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBER 
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Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Mi! 8 1998 
Re: Supplemental authority case number 870334-CA, 
Bobbie C. Dickinson vs. Sherril Cottrell Dickinson. 
Dear Sir: 
Pursuant to rule 24(j), the Respondent directs the Court's 
attention to the recent decision in Porco vs. Porco, 752 P2.d 365 
(Utah Appellate, 1988). 
The decision in the Porco case is relevant to points I, II, 
IV and V at pages 15, 16, 21 and 25, respectively, of respon-
dent's brief. 
It is respectfully requested that this supplemental author-
ity be brought to the attention of the panel assigned the above-
referenced appeal. Pursuant to the Court's rule, five copies 
hereof are enclosed. Further, be advised that a copy has been 
furnished to opposing counsel. 
Sincerely, 
1 ^ ^ ^ 
Kay L. McIff 
KLM/sc 
cc: Marcus Taylor, Attorney 
for Plaintiff-Appellant 
PORCO v. 
Cite as 752 ?2d 365 
the light most favorable to the court below, 
the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings." Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Fitzger-
ald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). Appellant has wholly failed 
to sustain this burden. Moreover, the 
record contains ample evidence from which 
the trial court could conclude that Borrego 
intended to disrupt the proceedings. 
[2] Borrego's second contention is that 
the court was required to warn him that his 
conduct was contumacious before a finding 
of contempt could be made. While admit-
ting that the court indicated that it found 
profanity in the courtroom extremely of-
fensive, defendant asserts that the state-
ment was not an effective warning because 
it was "made to Mr. Borrego's attorney 
and not to Mr. Borrego directly, and no 
direction was given to counsel to warn Mr. 
Borrego." The assertion is clearly without 
merit The record of proceedings is suffi-
cient to establish that Borrego was made 
aware that his conduct was inappropriate 
and that he was represented by competent 
counsel who was aware of proper court-
room conduct. Finally, Borrego's reliance 
on Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94 
S.Ct 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974) is mis-
placed. Eaton was a per curiam decision 
holding that a trial judge's finding of con-
tempt based solely on the use of an exple-
tive in response to cross-examination could 
not be affirmed. The decision specifically 
noted that the expletive was not directed 
toward the court and that there was no 
indication in the record of loud or boister-
ous conduct or any attempt to prevent the 
court from carrying on its duties. The 
factual situation is markedly different from 
that presented by the transcript of proceed-
ings in the present case. 
[3] Borrego further contends that the 
findings are insufficient in that they do not 
detail how the sentencing "was delayed or 
unduly interrupted" by his comments. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3 (1987) requires 
the court to recite the facts as occurring 
"in [the court's] immediate view and pres-
ence" that support the judgment of con-
*~~*^ + Tk<> /»ruiv-t in this case found, in 
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relevant part, that defendant "became loud 
and boisterous, using profanity which tend-
ed to interrupt the due course of the sen-
tencing hearing." In reviewing a challenge 
to a trial court's factual findings, we apply 
a "clearly erroneous" standard. That stan-
dard requires that "if the findings . . . are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made, the findings . . . will be set 
aside." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987). We conclude that the findings 
of the trial court are supported by the 
weight of the evidence and that they ade-
quately support the judgment of the court. 
The judgment of contempt is affirmed. 
GARFF, JACKSON and ORME, JJ., 
concur. 
( O | KEY NUMMI SYSTEM> 
Guido C. PORCO, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
• . 
Vincenza Mangio PORCO, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 860150-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 5, 1988. 
Former husband brought motion seek-
ing to terminate alimony, to secure return 
of certain personal property and to recover 
attorney fees. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, John A. Rokich, J., de-
nied motion and ordered former husband to 
pay former wife's attorney fees, and for-
mer husband appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Garff, J., held that (1) finding that 
there had been no material change in par-
ties' circumstances, as required to modify 
divorce decree, was amply supported by the 
record; (2) absent showing of substantive 
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change in circumstances concerning distri-
bution of property, divorce decree could not 
be modified; (3) trial court's award of at-
torney fees was not in abuse of discretion; 
and (4) former wife was entitled to costs 
and attorney fees on appeal. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
1. Divorce <s=*164 
Having failed to appeal original di-
vorce decree, former husband, in order to 
modify decree, had to show substantial 
change of circumstances occurring since 
entry of decree and not contemplated in 
decree itself. 
2. Divorce <S=*245(3) 
Finding that there had been no materi-
al change in parties' circumstances, as re-
quired to modify divorce decree, was amply 
supported by the record, which showed 
that former wife still required $200 alimo-
ny award to maintain as nearly as possible 
her previous standard of living and to pre-
vent her from becoming a public charge. 
3. Divorce <3=>254(2), 255 
Absent showing of substantive change 
in circumstances concerning distribution of 
property, divorce decree could not be mod-
ified and matters previously litigated and 
incorporated therein could not be collateral-
ly attacked in face of doctrine of res judica-
ta. 
4. Divorce <3=>254(2) 
Trial court's alleged failure to award 
husband other property in wife's posses-
sion, which he originally purchased, was 
not a changed circumstance as would sup-
port modification of divorce decree. 
5. Divorce <S=»254(1) 
Radial arm saw was not a "hand tool" 
under terms of divorce decree. 
6. Divorce <s=*227(l) 
In divorce action, award of attorney 
fees must be supported by the evidence 
that amount awarded was reasonable and 
that party receiving award was reasonably 
in need. 
7. Divorce <&=»227(1) 
Factors of reasonableness of attorn** 
fees in divorce actions include necessity^ 
number of hours dedicated, reasonableness 
of rate charged in light of difficulty of cast 
and result accomplished, and rates con** 
monly charged for divorce actions in the 
community. 
8. Divorce <fc*224 
Pleadings, discovery, former husband's 
obstreperous behavior, time devoted to pre-
trial matters and actual trial time reflected 
apparent reasonableness of former wife's 
request for attorney fees in divorce action. 
9. Divorce <s=>226 
Evidence of former wife's need for as-
sistance in paying her attorney fees unfold-
ed during entire trial, so special proceeding 
specifically concerned with determining her 
need was not necessary. 
10. Costs «=>260(5) 
Former husband's frivolous appeal and 
his apparent harassment of former wife 
through repeated civil actions against her 
warranted award of costs and attorney 
fees on appeal. Court of Appeals Rule 
33(a). 
11. Costs «=>26(KD 
Sanctions for frivolous appeals should 
only be applied in egregious cases, lest 
there be improper chilling of right to ap-
peal erroneous trial court decisions, but 
sanctions should be imposed when appeal is 
obviously without any merit and has been 
taken with no reasonable likelihood of pre-
vailing and results in delayed implementa-
tion of judgment of lower court, increased 
costs of litigation and dissipation of time 
and resources. Court of Appeals Rules 
33(a), 40(a). 
Joseph H. Gallegos, Michael R. Sciumba-
to, Gallegos & Sciumbato, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and appellant 
John Spencer Snow, Snow & Halliday, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and respon-
dent 
Before GARFF, JACKSON and 
ORME, JJ. 
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OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Plaintiff/appellant Guido and defend-
ant/respondent Vincenza Porco were di-
vorced on July 14, 1977, after a twenty-sev-
en year marriage. The trial court ordered 
plaintiff to pay defendant $200 alimony per 
month and distributed the parties' proper-
ty. 
Plaintiff has unsuccessfully attempted to 
terminate or modify alimony payments 
four times between January 1980 and the 
filing of this action on February 29, 1984. * 
He has previously refused to pay alimony, 
which has resulted in several judgments 
and garnishment proceedings being taken 
against him. By his present motion, he 
seeks to terminate ahmony, to secure the 
return of certain personal property, and to 
recover attorney fees. Defendant filed a 
motion in response to plaintiffs motion 
seeking alimony arrearages, attorney fees, 
and an order restraining plaintiff from ha-
rassing her by continually bringing modifi-
cation actions. 
On July 31, 1985, the trial court denied 
plaintiffs motion and ordered him to pay 
defendant's attorney fees. Plaintiff con-
tends that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by (1) finding no material change of 
circumstances and, thereby, refusing to 
terminate alimony; (2) failing to award 
plaintiff certain items of personal property; 
and (3) awarding $1,500 in attorney fees to 
defendant 
[1] Plaintiff did not appeal the original 
divorce decree. To modify the decree now, 
p)amtilf must show "a substantia) change 
of circumstances occurring since the entry 
of the decree and not contemplated in the 
decree itself." Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 
707, 710 (Utah 1985). See also Jeppson v. 
Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984); 
Christiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 
1. Plaintiff instituted modification actions in 
January 1980, May 1980, October 1981, and 
June 1982. 
2. The original divorce decree was entered on 
July 14, 1977. 
3. Plaintiff was originally awarded two vehicles, 
a camper, several guns, various hand tools and 
PORCO v. PORCO 
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592, 594 (Utah 1983). The trial court found 
there was no material change of circum-
stances. To overturn this finding, plaintiff 
must show that the evidence clearly pre-
ponderates to the contrary, or that the trial 
court abused its discretion or misapplied 
the law, or that the trial court's award 
works such a manifest injustice as to show 
clearly an abuse of discretion. Gill v. Gill, 
718 P.2d 779, 780 (Utah 1986). However, 
the trial court is afforded considerable dis-
cretion, and its actions are cloaked with a 
presumption of validity. Id; see also 
King v. King, 717 P.2d 715, 715-16 (Utah 
1986); Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 670 
(Utah Ct.App.1987). 
I 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
[2] The record amply supports the trial 
court's finding that there has been no ma-
terial change in the parties* circumstances. 
Although plaintiffs and defendant's in-
comes have increased, their expenses have 
also increased proportionately, resulting in 
no substantial change in their relative fi-
nancial positions. Defendant still requires 
the $200 alimony award to maintain as 
nearly as possible her previous standard of 
living and to prevent her from becoming a 
public charge. See English v. English, 565 
P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). We affirm the 
trial court on this issue. 
II 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
[3] Ten years after entry of the original 
divorce decree,2 plaintiff requests that this 
Court redistribute certain items of personal 
property.3 Plaintiff has failed to show any 
substantive change of circumstance con-
cerning the distribution of property and 
"persona! possessions and affects [sic] as his 
sole and separate property now in his posses-
sion." Defendant was awarded "all of the fur-
nishings and effects, including the fixtures and 
appliances and other personal property in the 
home of the parties not awarded to the plain-* 
tiff." 
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"[i]n the absence of such a showing, the 
decree shall not be modified and the mat-
ters previously litigated and incorporated 
therein cannot be collaterally attacked in 
face of the doctrine of res judicata. Conse-
quently, [the] attempt to challenge the eq-
uity of the original decree cannot be toler-
ated." Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 
P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978) (footnote omit-
ted). See also Foulger v. Foulger, 626 
P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981). 
[4] Plaintiff further alleges that the tri-
al court's failure to award him other per-
sonal property in defendant's possession, 
which he originally purchased, has resulted 
in a serious inequity requiring reversal of 
the original property distribution. How-
ever, this is not a changed circumstance, so 
any inequity should have been resolved at 
the original trial or by appeal of that deci-
sion. 
[5] Plaintiff also seeks to have defend-
ant held in contempt of court for failing to 
return to him a radial arm saw. He spe-
ciously argues that it can be operated with 
one hand, and, therefore, under the terms 
of the original decree, is his property as a 
"hand tool." Obviously, a radial arm saw 
is not a hand tool. This argument merely 
epitomizes the frivolous nature of this ap-
peal, and warrants no further comment 
We thus affirm the trial court's refusal to 
redistribute the personal property. 
Ill 
ATTORNEY FEES 
16,7] Plaintiff contends that attorney 
fees should not have been awarded to de-
fendant because there was insufficient evi-
dence of defendant's need. In divorce ac-
tions, an award of attorney fees must be 
supported by evidence that the amount 
awarded was reasonable and that the party 
receiving the award was reasonably in 
need. Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 
(Utah 1986). "Relevant factors of reason-
ableness include 'the necessity of the num-
4. In any case, the award might be sustainable 
on an alternate ground, pursuant to Utah Code 
ber of hours dedicated, the reasonableness 
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty 
of the case and the result accomplished, 
and the rates commonly charged for di-
vorce actions in the community.' " Beals v.* 
Beats, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984) (quot 
ing Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 
(Utah 1980)); see also Talley v. Talley, 739 
P.2d 83, 84 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
[8] Defendant's attorney submitted a 
well-documented affidavit requesting 
$4,130.70. By comparison, the trial court's 
award of $1,500 was minimal. No cross-ap-
peal concerning the attorney fee award 
was filed by defendant, and we, according-
ly, have no occasion to consider whether 
error was committed in awarding this re-
duced amount The pleadings, discovery, 
plaintiff's obstreperous behavior, time de-
voted to pre-trial matters, and actual trial 
time all reflect the apparent reasonable-
ness of defendant's request, much less the 
amount actually awarded. 
[9] Evidence of defendant's need for as-
sistance in paying her attorney fees unfold-
ed during the entire trial, so a special pro-
ceeding specifically concerned with deter-
mination of her need is not necessary. The 
Utah Supreme Court similarly concluded in 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 
1279 (Utah 1987), stating: "Because ample 
evidence of [the wife's] financial condition 
was before the court, we reject [the hus-
band's] argument that the trial court's find-
ing of need was unsupported by the evi-
dence." 
Because the trial court's award was 
based on evidence that the amount award-
ed was reasonable and defendant was in 
need, the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in awarding attorney fees to de-
fendant4 
IV 
SANCTIONS FOR 
FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
In oral argument, defendant's counsel 
argued for the imposition of sanctions on 
plaintiff for bringing a frivolous appeal. 
determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or 
STATE v. WALKER 
Cite m» 752 ?2d 369 (Utah App. 1988) 
distressed both by of his arguments, 
Utah 369 
[10] This Court is 
the frivolous nature of this appeal and by 
plaintiffs apparent harassment of defend-
ant through repeatedly bringing civil ac-
tions against her and, thereby, forcing her 
to pay substantial court costs and attorney 
fees. Rule 33(a) of the Rules of Utah 
Court of Appeals provides that "[i]f the 
court determines that a motion made or an 
appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages and single or double costs, includ-
ing reasonable attorney fees, to the prevail-
ing party." 
We find no legal or factual basis for this 
appeal in the record. Instead, it is merely 
a continuation of plaintiffs efforts to ha-
rass defendant. This Court has previously 
defined a frivolous appeal as "one having 
no reasonable legal or factual basis as de-
fined in Rule 40(a)."5 O'Brien t>. Rush, 
744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah CtApp.1987); see 
also Barber v. The Emporium Partner-
ship, 750 P.2d 202, 203 (Ct.App. 1988). 
[11] We recognize that sanctions for 
frivolous appeals should only be applied in 
egregious cases, lest there be an improper 
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous 
lower court decisions. However, sanctions 
should be imposed when "an appeal is obvi-
ously without any merit and has been tak-
en with no reasonable likelihood of prevail-
ing, and results in delayed implementation 
of the judgment of the lower court; in-
creased costs of litigation; and dissipation 
of the time and resources of the Law 
Court" Auburn Harpswell Ass'n v. Day, 
438 A.2d 234, 239 (Me.1981). Therefore, 
we award costs and attorney fees on appeal 
to defendant 
At some point, plaintiff should under-
stand that his emotional involvement in this 
case completely distorts the factual merits 
5. Rule 40(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals states, in pertinent part, that: 
The signature of an attorney or a party consti-
tutes a certificate that the attorney or the 
party has read the motion, brief, or other 
paper; that to the best of the attorney's or the 
party's knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing 
law or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law; 
That message has previ-
ously been delivered five different times by 
the trial court. We wish to make it clear to 
plaintiff, by imposing this sanction, that 
any further efforts on his part to punish 
defendant will only result in his increased 
expenditure of time, effort and money. 
We affirm the trial court's decision and 
remand this matter to the trial court for 
determination of the full amount of costs 
and attorney fees, without reduction, rea-
sonably incurred by defendant on appeal.4 
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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Anita Cuba WALKER aka Anita Cuba 
Lofgreen aka Kelly Walker, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 870434-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 7, 1988. 
Defendant moved to reinstate criminal 
appeal from judgment of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. Uno, 
J. The Court of Appeals held that al-
though defense counsel took no actions be-
yond preliminary steps for initiating ap-
peal, appeal would be reinstated since re-
fusal to reinstate might result in denial of 
and that it is not interposed for any improper 
purposes, such as to harass or cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. 
6. The trial court is authorized to allocate re-
sponsibility for payment of defendant's costs 
and fees on appeal, in whole or in part, to 
plaintiff or to plaintiffs attorney as it deems 
appropriate. 
